

THE POETRY OF ETHICS: HORACE, *EPISTLES* I

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In 23 B.C. the first three books of Horace's *Odes* appeared. In the years which followed, up to the completion of *Epistles* I, his work took a new direction, and the ethical themes which had had a marked place in his lyric verse became his entire concern: in his own words (*Ep.* I. I. 10-11),

nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono;
quid verum atque decens curo et rogo, et omnis in hoc sum.

What Horace describes in this context, at the very beginning of the book, is a kind of conversion to philosophy;¹ and so the reader is at once drawn to ask what philosophy means to the poet. Before considering this question by scrutiny of the poems, two more general ones should be raised: first, what are the dominant features of ancient ethics as a whole and how far does it differ from modern ethical systems or moral thinking?² Second, what part did moral philosophy play in the life of Romans in Horace's time? The answers I shall give to these very large questions are pragmatic and limited: they are meant simply as preparation for considering Horace's *Epistles*.

There are, of course, different schools of thought in Greek ethics; but for all of them the summit of moral aspiration and the centre of ethical reflection is the good man and the good life. The vocabulary of the *Epistles* reflects this concern: the key terms are words like *sapientia*, *virtus*, *aequus animus*, *nil admirari*, *recte vivere*, all of which refer to a habit of mind or a manner of living. In modern times ethics has become both more abstract and more specific. Philosophers have tended more and more to the analysis of moral concepts and judgements.³ At best, this tendency is actuated by more than curiosity about language; it follows from the inquiry into the possibility of knowledge which begins with Descartes and is reformed and reinforced by Hume, Kant and others. Thus ethical problems have been the cognitive ones: how far, if at all, is morality rational or objective? Can judgements and valuations be distinguished from mere whims or fancies, and if so, wherein lies the distinction? And if to judge or evaluate is not simply to describe, what relation do they bear to the world, or to the body of experiences which goes by that name? These problems are known to antiquity too; but the answers to them in modern times have been designed to satisfy a subject who is because he thinks. If we turn to more popular moral thinking, it seems that the scope of morality has narrowed since ancient times. If ordinary English usage tells us anything, 'ethics' is something associated with a particular profession: there is a code which governs the behaviour of doctors or solicitors as such and makes infringements of it 'unethical', but beyond that the word has no widely recognized application.⁴ 'Moral' extends further; but the stuff of morality is particular duties (or rights) and actions. Morality enters into life where there are 'questions of principle' concerning a possible decision; and that phrase implies that such questions are not always present. At this point the popular and the philosophical lines of thought converge; for both tend to isolate and limit the realm of morality.

But ancient ethics is at once more general and more concrete. The question which animates it was posed by Plato, who with his teacher Socrates brought ethics to birth in the West: how ought I to live? (cf. *Rep.* 352D; *Gorg.* 500C). In other words, the ancient moral philosopher was also a moralist, and his moralizing is an attempt to define the art of

¹ On this phenomenon in antiquity see A. D. Nock, *Conversion* (1933), ch. 11. Horace's account of his conversion is an unusual one in not conforming to the dogmatic pattern that Nock traces; it need be no less genuine for that, though it is clearly meant to signal a new departure in his poetry. For a sensitive account of Horace's mobility of belief and mood in *Ep.* I, see J. Perret, *Horace* (1959), 149-53.

² A very helpful general treatment of ancient ethics, to which I am indebted in many respects, is A. Dihle s.v. 'Ethik' in *RAC* 6 (1966), 646-796; the article includes a select bibliography.

³ The most striking exception to this generalization is existentialism. It is no surprise to find that its progenitor, Kierkegaard, is a profound and subtle connoisseur of Greek ethics. Another exception is 'attualismo': see G. Calogero (also a fine connoisseur of Greek philosophy and a pupil of Socrates), e.g. *La conclusione della filosofia del conoscere* (1960); *Filosofia del dialogo* (1962).

⁴ I do not count as ordinary usage the sense in which I have used 'ethical' in this context, i.e. 'pertaining to moral philosophy'.

living,⁵ an art being a method with a goal, which must be learnt: the starting-point of this enterprise is naturally an account of the human condition. Moreover, to him, happiness and goodness are one; for to live well cannot but be to fulfil oneself. Thus his task is not to separate right from expedient, but rather to prove their identity: the project of Plato's *Republic*, for example, is 'to define how each of us may lead his whole life most profitably', (344E); this is how Plato goes about showing that morality is not a chimera. To that extent, then, ancient ethics is self-centred: it is focussed on what is good for each of us; and indeed much of what for the ancients was moral philosophy would now be called psychotherapy, since its business was with the well-being or wholeness of the inner man. This is offensive to any who think of duty or altruism as the heart of morality; it does not mean that duty or altruism were notions neglected by ancient ethics.

What, then, was the place of philosophy in Horace's environment, and how for him and men like him did it identify and face the problems of living? In the first century B.C. there were well-established schools of thought; and the study of philosophy was part of a full education. Horace himself went to Athens as a young man where, as he puts it (*Ep.* 2. 2. 43-5),

adiecere bonae paulo plus artis Athenae,
scilicet ut vellem curvo dinoscere rectum
atque inter silvas Academi quaerere verum.

But philosophy was not merely an academic discipline in our sense. Philosophers were esteemed and cultivated by some public men, or even maintained by them as advisers or tutors;⁶ and their ethics found many applications to everyday life. This fact is implicitly clear in Cicero's philosophical writings, especially the *De officiis*; and we have lively illustrations of it from his letters.⁷ Thus he thanks Luceius for a letter of condolence as follows (*Ad fam.* 5. 13. 1-2):

Quamquam ipsa consolatio litterarum tuarum mihi gratissima est (declarat enim summam benevolentiam coniunctam pari prudentia), tamen illum fructum ex iis litteris vel maximum cepi, quod te praeclare res humanas contemnentem et optime contra fortunam paratum armatumque cognovi; quam quidem laudem sapientiae statuo esse maximam, non aliunde pendere nec extrinsecus aut bene aut male vivendi suspensas habere rationes. quae cogitatio cum mihi non omnino excidisset (etenim penitus inseederat), vi tamen tempestatum et concursu calamitatum erat aliquantum labefactata atque convulsa; cui te opitulari et video et id fecisse etiam proximis litteris multumque profecisse sentio.

Consolation was one of the major tasks of philosophy because it taught how to face something no-one can avoid in life, suffering and bereavement; and the many consolatory letters and treatises which survive reveal that its teachings were taken seriously and found valuable. Here it is in particular the Stoic doctrine that the only good is virtue or wisdom⁸ which comforts Cicero. Or again, this is how he writes to his predecessor as governor of Cilicia, Appius Claudius Pulcher, who was complaining that Cicero had failed to meet him (*Ad fam.* 3. 7. 5):⁹

Illud idem Pausania dicebat te dixisse: 'quidni? Appius Lentulo, Lentulus Ampio processit obviam, Cicero Appio noluit?' quaeso, etiamne tu has ineptias, homo mea sententia summa prudentia, multa etiam doctrina, plurimo rerum usu, addo urbanitatem, quae est virtus, ut Stoici rectissime putant? ullam Appietatem aut Lentulitatem valere apud me plus quam ornamenta virtutis existimas? cum ea consecutus nondum eram quae sunt hominum opinionibus amplissima, tamen ista vestra nomina numquam sum admiratus; viros eos qui ea vobis reliquissent magnos arbitrabar. postea vero quam ita et cepi et gessi maxima imperia, ut mihi

⁵ Besides Plato, passim, cf. Plut., *Mor.* 613B and the Loeb editors' note ad loc.

⁶ e.g. Scipio and Panaetius (*RE* 18. 2. 422-3); Tiberius Gracchus and Blossius (*RE* 3. 571); Piso and Philodemus (*RE* 19. 2445); Cicero and Diodotus (*RE* 5. 715); Octavian, and Athenodorus and Arius (*RE* Supp. 5. 49-51).

⁷ For another one, see Ed. Fraenkel, *Horace* (1957), 361.

⁸ Shackleton Bailey ad loc. compares *Tusc.* 3. 37 and 5. 36. See further *SVF* 3. 49-67.

⁹ On going to meet (ἀπάντησις or ὑπάντησις) as a conventional honour, see T. E. V. Pearce, *CQ* 20 (1970), 313-16.

nihil neque ad honorem neque ad gloriam adquirendum putarem, superiorem quidem numquam, sed parem vobis me speravi esse factum. nec mehercule aliter vidi existimare vel Cn. Pompeium, quem omnibus qui umquam fuerunt, vel P. Lentulum, quem mihi ipsi antepono; tu si aliter existimas, nihil errabis si paulo diligentius, ut quid sit εὐγένεια [quid sit nobilitas] intellegas, Athenodorus, Sandonis filius, quid de his rebus dicat attenderis.¹⁰

Here Cicero is anxious to calm Appius' wounded pride; at the same time, as a *novus homo*, he wants to keep up his self-esteem against the anger of a *nobilis*. By appeal to philosophic teachings he can both soothe and scold his addressee with detachment and as an equal, implying that they should both act as what they are, men of quality and urbanity; and since it is Cicero who recognizes this, he can even feel himself—without saying so, of course—to be the superior.

This much to indicate how Horace's *Epistles* are by no means an oddity in their application of philosophical teaching to daily affairs. In them too, ethics belongs in every kind of situation because its business is life as a whole. Thus in *Epistle* 5, in inviting Torquatus to dinner, Horace introduces a topic discussed by Aristotle and Zeno, whether the wise man will ever get drunk.¹¹ This is not a trivial matter because it implies a deeper and broader question, whether the good life is rigidly consistent or admits of relaxation and even abandon;¹² and so it comes to be asked if drunkenness is a natural release or a vicious distortion. Or again, *Epistle* 9 is a letter of commendation, like those in *Ad familiares* XIII. Here too there is a problem of ethics and etiquette (two things the ancients did not sharply distinguish): is Horace to recommend his friend Septimius to the great Tiberius and risk defeating his purpose by presuming too far? Or is he, for fear of that, to do nothing and cut the figure of a selfish hypocrite? Naturally the questions behind many of the *Epistles* cover larger areas of life than these do, but they exemplify a major theme of the book, how to behave in society and to consort with the great. This theme is nowhere more exhaustively treated than in *Epistles* 17 and 18.

These poems address two different men on the same topic: that is, in effect, how to make a career, since friendship (*amicitia*) with the powerful was a normal and indispensable path to success.¹³ But such a choice of life imposes a severe discipline. The dependent has to restrain, or at least refrain from expressing, the desire to get rich that is naturally one of his motives: not only because he might obstruct his own aims by putting off his patron or causing squabbles with other dependents, but because if the great man does satisfy his wishes, that may lead him to debauchery and bankruptcy (17. 43–51; 18. 21–36). He must in conversation be neither slavishly obsequious nor gruffly obstinate (18. 1–20),¹⁴ he must be adaptable in company without being indiscreet or disloyal (18. 37–71), and so on. Behind the rich humour of these poems, their sometimes gaily satirical treatment of what can go wrong in the careerist's life and the sometimes gently mocking tone of their precepts, lie an ideal of how to live in society, the man who has the self-knowledge to be simply what he is with others. By recognizing the limitations of his status, as the philosopher Aristippus did (17. 13–32), he accepts them with dignity; and he feels no need to assert himself by acting the pontificating pundit (18. 15–20), the retiring *littérateur* (18. 39–66)¹⁵ or the extravagant playboy (18. 31–6). In short, the dependent cannot find favour with his patron if he is not himself worthy of respect, if he does not, in the way proper to his choice of life, live rightly.

¹⁰ On *urbanitas* and εὐγένεια as philosophical topics, see Shackleton Bailey's notes. Chrysippus labelled as virtues εὐσπαντησία, εὐτραπέλεια and ἐπιδειξιότης (*SVF* 3. 255); but it looks rather as if Cicero is alluding to the Stoic use of ἀστεῖος as equivalent to σοφός or σπουδαίος (see *SVF* Index), though of course they did not mean by it the same as Latin *urbanus*, as he was no doubt aware. It is clear in any case that in his mention of the Stoics, as of Athenodorus, he is dragging in philosophical doctrine—which brings out its value to him as an arbiter of proper conduct and right thinking.

¹¹ cf. *CQ* 27 (1977), 361. Further *SVF* 1. 229; 3. 643–4, 712. Plut., *Mor.* 613B–C is illuminating in general on the ethics of symposia, a theme treated by Horace himself in the *Odes* (esp. 1. 18 and 3. 21) and the *Satires* (2. 6. 65–76). Some Peripatetics wrote

περὶ μέθης: see Wehrli on Chamaeleon frag. 9–13; later, note Philo, *Ebr.* 91; Sen., *Ep.* 83. 8–27; Dio Chrys. 27. 1–4.

¹² See further M. J. McGann, *Studies in Horace's First Book of Epistles* (1969), 29 on *Ep.* 1. 18. 59–64, and Kiessling-Heinze⁹ (1957), ad loc. (henceforth, K.-H.).

¹³ In general on Roman *amicitia* and its ethics, see P. A. Brunt, *PCPS* 191 (1965), 1–8. For an attractive account of Horace on friendship see W. S. Maguinness, *Hermathena* 51 (1938), 29–48. Note also P. White, 'Amicitia and the Profession of Poetry in Early Imperial Rome', *JRS* 68 (1978), 74–92.

¹⁴ More relevant to this section than Aristotle ap. Stob., *Ecl. Eth.* 2. 7. 25, mentioned by K.-H. on line 9, is *EN* 1126^b 11–16.

¹⁵ On this section, see further *ZPE* 23 (1976), 41–3.

In effect, in these *Epistles* Horace has written in his own manner a *De amicitia*, in the tradition that flows from *Nicomachean Ethics* VIII-IX; the type of friendship concerned is what Aristotle calls φίλια καθ' ὑπεροχήν.¹⁶ It is natural, then, to find Horace towards the end of *Epistle* 18 (96-103) telling Lollius to study philosophy:

inter cuncta leges et percontabere doctos
qua ratione queas traducere leniter aevum:
num te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido,
num pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes,
virtutem doctrina paret naturane donet,
quid minuat curas, quid te tibi reddat amicum,
quid pure tranquillet, honos an dulce lucellum
an secretum iter et fallentis semita vitae.

The last line echoes Epicurus' 'Live in secret' (λάθε βίωσας: frag. 551 Usener); the same phrase was recalled in 17. 10:

nec vixit male qui natus moriensque fefellit.

In both places it indicates that there is an alternative to a career in high society; and the person who embodies that alternative is the poet himself, living and studying in the seclusion of his Sabine farm. Now Horace had had such a career: the words which encourage the faint-hearted man in 17.35

principibus placuisse viris haud ultima laus est

are very like those applied to Horace's own life in 20.23:

me primis urbis belli placuisse domique.¹⁷

So behind the advice to careerists is first-hand knowledge; and in the argument of *Epistle* 18 it is the recommendation of philosophy which connects the counsels to Lollius with Horace's account of his own position. In other words, both men alike need philosophy; and Horace also shares with Lollius the need for some material goods (18. 107-10). Likewise in *Epistle* 17 he recognizes, as Epicurus did,¹⁸ that a life of simplicity and retirement like his own cannot satisfy everyone. Thus the poet's philosophic detachment does not cause him to look down with pity or contempt on other people;¹⁹ he tries rather to see what all men, and what each individual, needs in order to live well, and to share his insight with his readers so that they can use it in their own way.

In neither *Epistle* 17 nor 18 does it emerge that Horace is the *amicus* of Maecenas. But this is not an evasion, since that aspect of his existence is the subject of *Epistle* 7. (To observe how the poems in *Epistles* I complement and contrast with each other adds greatly to the appreciation of each one; this cannot, of course, be achieved by positing a single 'structure' for the book.)²⁰ The beginning of the letter reveals that Horace has delayed returning to Maecenas at Rome; and the whole is an excuse for his not doing so. But the form of the excuse takes us deep into the ethics of gratitude and friendship. Friendship was a major topic in ancient philosophy:²¹ in part because it was seen as a kind of informal contract for the exchange of benefits, so that the rights and obligations of friends could seem worth defining; in part because friendship manifests the need for others that exists in

¹⁶ cf. Maguinness, op. cit., 33-4. For thoughtful remarks on *Ep.* 18 as a whole, see H. Rohdich, *RM* 115 (1972), 261-88, though he rather underrates the humorous and satirical element in the poem.

¹⁷ On the meaning of this line see E. Wistrand, *Horace's Ninth Epode* (1958), 38-9 = *Opera Selecta* (1972), 326-7.

¹⁸ See frags. 555-7 Usener (cf. K.-H. ad loc.). Cf. *Cic.*, *Off.* 1. 110 (Panaetius); Sen., *De tranqu.* 7. 2.

¹⁹ Contrast *Lucr.* 2. 1-13 and the passages quoted in Bailey's *Addenda*, p. 1751.

²⁰ McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), ch. 2 tactfully indicates a wealth of connections in *Ep.* 1.

²¹ For a thoughtful and comprehensive treatment see J.-C. Fraise, *Philia* (1974); he helpfully explains why friendship is a 'lost problem' of philosophy and why it need no longer be.

us all and so must be included in any account of how to live well (cf. below on 10. 49–50). So in *Epistle* 7. 20–4 we find a compressed statement of how favours should be given and taken:

prodigus et stultus donat quae spernit et odit:
haec seges ingratos tulit et feret omnibus annis.
vir bonus et sapiens dignis ait esse paratus,
nec tamen ignorat quid distent aera lupinis;
dignum praestabo me etiam pro laude merentis.²²

The delicate balance in the phrasing of the last line pictures the equality Horace claims in fact. Maecenas has shown himself a good and wise man by giving the poet something truly valuable. Horace will return the favour by being not merely grateful, as is implied by line 21 and stated by lines 37–8,²³ but ‘worthy’ as Maecenas is. That means that if Maecenas were to devalue his gifts by using them to restrict the poet’s freedom, or if Horace himself were in danger of becoming a slave to them, then he would ‘give back everything’ (34, *cuncta resigno*). This is a critical moment in the argument of the poem: Horace threatens, if only in theory, a complete break. But the crisis is overcome by an implicit distinction. What Horace would give back is the luxury and grandeur of city-life; but his country retreat, Maecenas’ most valuable gift, and his freedom are bound up with each other. So to have bestowed independence on the poet is Maecenas’ merit as a giver; and Horace’s staying out of town is therefore the right response on the part of the receiver.

This is subtle diplomacy; it also sketches an ideal relationship between a superior and an inferior, in which generosity on the one side and gratitude on the other are guaranteed by equality and respect. The story of Mena and Philippus which follows fills out this ideal by portraying a debased giving and taking of favours. Philippus’ envious and restless egoism is at first contrasted with the healthy and contented self-love of Mena; but it then corrupts the lesser man and brings him unhappiness, because it betrays his true wishes. Mena’s mistake, and what Horace means to avoid, is a failure of self-knowledge. All this too is diplomatic, because the bad relationship of patron and dependent is represented only by the two men in the story, not by Maecenas and Horace. But it also shows with painful clarity and blunt humour what could go wrong between them; and the ethical reflections of the earlier part of the poem are thus an insurance as well as an ideal. Now we cannot say whether *Epistle* 7 was prompted by anything that passed between Horace and Maecenas, nor, if it was, what passed between them. But Horace is not inviting his readers to reconstruct a part of his biography,²⁴ but to see how the philosophy which governs his existence applies to life, how it can interpret conflicts between people and resolve them by combining a moral pattern with a natural fact, the duties of the friend with the needs of the individual.

Some readers think of Horace as complacent, and it is true that in the poems so far considered here he presents his own way of life, however unassumingly, as an ideal, offering what he is to his readers to help them as he has helped himself. But that does not mean he cannot look sharply into his own life and character. Indeed, one peculiar *finesse* of the *Epistles* is how Horace voices for the benefit of friends more or less jocular self-criticism. Then in *Epistle* 4 he ends with the words (15–16)

me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises,
cum ridere voles, Epicuri de grege porcum.²⁵

This confirms, even as it humorously softens, the Epicurean message of lines 12–14:²⁶

²² On the philosophical background to these lines see Fraenkel, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 330–2; O. Hiltbrunner, *Gymnasium* 67 (1960), 298 n. 12; McGann, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 13. On the whole I find the most satisfactory account of the poem and their place in it is K. Büchner, *Hermes* 75 (1940), 64–80 = *Studien zur römischen Literatur* III (1962), 139–57.

²³ On line 38, see *CQ* 27 (1977), 372–3; cf. further *Epic.*, frag. 589 Usener; *Ter.*, *Ad.* 73.

²⁴ cf. C. Becker, *Das Spätwerk des Horaz* (1963),

23, on *Ep.* 14: ‘Was an der ‘Situation’ . . . des Briefes real und was erdichtet ist . . . lässt sich nicht entscheiden; für das Verständnis des Briefes hängt davon auch nichts ab. Die Alternative: real oder fiktiv, wird dem literarischen Charakter eines solchen Briefes nicht gerecht’. Similarly McGann, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 89–100.

²⁵ On the force of these lines, see McGann, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 44.

²⁶ See K.-H. ad loc.

inter spem curamque, timores inter et iras,
omnem crede diem tibi diluxisse supremum:
grata superveniet quae non sperabitur hora.

Tibullus clearly needs not only the comforts of the right kind of philosophy, but also someone to laugh at and with; and it is that role which Horace tactfully assumes. In *Epistle 8* Celsus risks being carried away by the good fortune that has made him 'companion and secretary' (2) to Tiberius. This point is delicately stressed by the pun on his *cognomen* (*celsus* = 'lofty') which is emphatically placed at the beginning of line 1 and separated from his *nomen*, Albinovanus.²⁷ In order to warn him of the danger, but without giving offence,²⁸ Horace describes his own condition: unlike Celsus he considers himself far from 'well' (*recte*: 4,15), and yet he knows that the trouble is in his own mind (4-12), whereas Celsus may fall for a purely outward success;²⁹ likewise, Horace knows he is disagreeable to his friends (9-10), which is what Celsus needs to realize he may be himself (17). Now the self-criticism in these poems is not only a matter of 'good form'; it is also part of the ancient ethical tradition,^{29a} embodied, like so much of that tradition, in the teaching and behaviour of Socrates. This is how Nicias in the *Laches* (187E-188B) describes the effect of talking with him:

You don't seem to know that whoever is nearest Socrates and joins with him in conversation cannot avoid, even if he starts talking first about something else, being continually dragged around by him in discussion until he falls into examining his whole life, past and present; and that when that has happened, Socrates will not let go of him until he has thoroughly scrutinized it all . . . And I think it no harm to be reminded of what we have done or are doing wrong. Rather, you cannot but face the future with more awareness if you do not run away from that experience, but want and demand, in Solon's phrase, to learn as long as you live, free of the delusion that old age brings wisdom in its train.

Here we see how Socrates brings others to be their own critics; he is, of course, that to himself too. Thus in the *Phaedrus* (229E-230A) he says that his aim is to know himself, an aim pursued by the whole dialogue in its analysis of the human soul; and in the *Apology* (38A) he, no less than others, is the object of that 'scrutiny' which is the purpose of his life. Later, Arrian's Epictetus says (2. 11. 1):

The beginning of philosophy, if we are to enter it properly, by the front door, is to be aware of our own weakness and incapacity where the essentials of life are concerned.³⁰

This is the beginning of philosophy for Horace too. So let us take *Epistle 1* to consider further that aspect of his ethics.

That poem, like *Epistle 7*, is an excuse and a refusal. Horace, despite Maecenas' insistence, will not take up poetry again. Such refusals (*recusationes*) are frequent in Augustan poetry,³¹ though this form is unusual. What is most common is that one kind of poetry (generally epic, cosmology, or high themes) is rejected for another (lyric, pastoral, elegy, or private themes). That often creates an ambiguity because in saying no to the grand

²⁷ The stilted word-order may be meant to recall Hesiod, frag. 211. 7 M.-W.: τρις μάκαρ Αλοκίδη και τετρακίς ἔλβιε Πηλεΐ (a *makarismos*, as *Ep.* 8. 1-2 are a salutation). If so, this emphasizes still further the mock-solemnity of the opening. For puns on names, see N. Horsfall, *Mnemosyne* Ser. 4. 28 (1976), 422; R. G. M. Nisbet, *JRS* 68 (1978), 8.

²⁸ Also tactful is delivering the whole message through the Muse, a device which at the same time, since it unnaturally elevates the tone of the letter, gently mocks Celsus' pride in his success.

²⁹ The words *gaudere et bene rem gerere* in line 1 already suggest that there is a kind of happiness or success better than Celsus'; the greeting which conventionally begins a letter is given an ethical form and meaning, as in [Plato], *Ep.* 3. 315A-B; Epic, frag. 95 Usener.

^{29a} On self-examination as a daily practice, see H. Chadwick, s.v. 'Gewissen' in *RAC* 10 (1978), 1056; also Horace himself, *Sat.* 1. 4. 133-8.

³⁰ cf. also 2. 17. 14-18, 2. 26. 4. 3. 23. 34 with *Hor., Ep.* 1. 1. 97-100 (a sense of conflict within the self as the beginning of philosophy). Socratic philosophy likewise starts by revealing contradiction in the interlocutor: e.g. Plato, *Gorg.* 457E, 460E-461A, 487B. Contradiction among men in general is also a beginning of philosophy: cf. *Hor., Ep.* 1. 1. 70-80 and Arr, *Epict.* 2. 11. 13, 2. 17. 10-13, 2. 24. 15.

³¹ See Nisbet and Hubbard, *A commentary on Horace: Odes 1* (1970) (henceforth N.-H.) on *Od.* 1. 6 (pp. 81-3).

subject the poet does in fact deal with it, though in a small compass and without committing himself to a style of writing that would not suit him. There is an ambiguity in *Epistle* 1 too, and a more thoroughgoing one. Horace has given up poetry for ethics; yet this is a book of poems, and highly finished and artistic ones. But this is not a merely frivolous irony, any more than Plato's attack on writing in the *Phaedrus*. The word he uses to describe poetry is *ludus*. It is, then, a game, or more precisely, a gladiatorial show or school: the metaphor of sport and combat stretches over the first fifteen lines of the poem. The poet is an entertainer; but the time has come for Horace to stop entertaining others and attend to his own soul. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a cure: a medical metaphor runs from line 28 to 40 and recurs at the end of the poem (101-3). So poetry is an obstacle to sound living, because art is not life, and because the artist, as such, cannot but be appealing to a public rather than improving himself. This severe view of poetry emerges elsewhere in *Epistles* 1, notably in 3 and 19; but it is there accompanied by a distinctly contrasting one. Writing is a part of life, and as an art is like ethics, the art of living; so good or bad qualities of the work—for example, sober independence, or slavish imitation and ambitious overreaching—correspond to moral achievements or failures of the man.³² The contradiction in this double view of poetry is never resolved; or rather, the only resolution is the *Epistles* themselves. They are that because their controlled and polished verbal art is a fine instrument for probing moral problems. This claim is in fact implicit in *Ep.* 1. 1. 12:

condo et compono quae mox depromere possim.

Condo and *compono* mean in the first instance 'store up, lay down'; but are also both words regularly used of poetic composition.³³ So in the same breath as Horace renounces poetry, he announces that that is what he is writing, and that its purpose is to supply 'provisions' for his new life. This conception of the moral value of poetry is further expressed in what he says of Homer in *Epistle* 2. However, by the same token, to write is not to have achieved wisdom; and that Horace has not achieved it becomes plain in what follows. His aspirations to philosophy are those of a restless, helpless and indecisive human being. 'The storm snatches' him from place to place, he 'drowns in the surge of public life' (the metaphor here is a striking contrast to Epicurean γαλήνη or Stoic εὔροια); he 'slides back' into hedonism and individualism; he is impatient as a tricked lover, a reluctant labourer or a mischievous boy. And what stops Horace getting on with the job is not Maecenas' pressure, but his own indecision; indeed, his attitude is that of one who *fails* to undertake philosophy like the man he berates in another protreptic, *Ep.* 1. 2. 32-43.³⁴ Compare too Epicurus, *Vatican Sayings* 14 (= frag. 204):

We have been born once, we cannot be born twice; and we must exist no more for infinite time. But you, though tomorrow is outside your control, put off the moment. Everyone's life is wasted in shilly-shallying, and so each of us busily dies.

So if Horace is still writing, his activity at the same time embodies a poetic ideal and reflects his awkward moral position: he reaches out towards philosophy, but his feet are planted in his own weakness.

Thus the bulk of *Epistle* 1 is a set of 'elementary teachings' (27):

restat ut his ego me ipse regam solerque elementis.

Its purpose is to identify the troubles for which philosophy is a cure: that is, very briefly, that people put material aims before moral ones, and that they are full of mental conflicts which stop them wanting anything, whether right or wrong, consistently. The theme of inconsistency brings us back to Horace as he described himself at the beginning of the poem. Here again he is in a state of confusion (97-100):

³² cf. *CQ* 27 (1977), 359-76 (esp. 362-3).

³³ A point drawn to my attention by Mr. Stephen Instone. *Compono* is further stressed by the word-play with *pono* (10) which it echoes antithetically;

on this type of pun see *G&R* 26 (1979), on *Od.* 1. 20.

³⁴ cf. *Sen.*, *Ep.* 1. 1-3. For other similar passages, see A. La Penna, *SIFC* 27/28 (1956), 192-3.

... quid mea cum pugnat sententia secum
quod petiit spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,
aestuat et vitae disconvenit ordine toto,
diruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis?

and indeed the whole poem was directed as much at the poet as at other men. So philosophy is what he needs. Maecenas, who fails to recognize this, comes in again for gentle criticism: he shows himself as inconsistent as the rest of mankind, because he laughs at Horace's oddities of dress, grumbles about his ill-cut finger-nails, but does not react at all to the confusion in his soul. But the poet goes on to put his own aims in a clearer light, which also somewhat softens his criticism of Maecenas; as in the *Epistles* as a whole (cf. above on 7 and 8) tact in expression and rigour in thought go closely together. He offers an extreme version of the ideal of wisdom, in Stoic terms, but at once deflates it (106-8):

ad summam: sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives,
liber, honoratus, pulcher, rex denique regum,
praecipue sanus—nisi cum pituita molesta est.

Even the complete sage is all-too-human; how much more must Horace go on sharing his weakness or sickness with other men. He will always be, like everyone who seeks wisdom, a beginner; and so studying philosophy does not set him on a different level from other men, including Maecenas. Moreover, he is still his patron's grateful friend (105):

de te pendentis, te respicientis amici.

The ethics which Horace sketches in this programmatic *Epistle* combines a strong desire to live better with a shrewd and humorous sense of his own and everyone's fallibility. Likewise, it combines a firm rejection of Maecenas' pressures with warm gratitude to his patron. Horace's morality is a middle way. However, that does not mean a baggy compromise but a firm tension between idealism and realism. Indeed, as an exhortation to philosophy, a προτρεπτικός λόγος, *Epistle* 1 is a good deal closer to the problems of living than is Aristotle's famous *Protrepticus*; and being addressed to the writer himself, it is also more candid and more aware of human fallibility.³⁵

The same self-critical element that pervades *Epistle* 1 finds expression again at the end of the book in *Epistle* 20.³⁶ This poem is addressed to the now complete volume as if it were a pretty slave-boy running away to make a fortune in the world out of its looks. The comparison between book and slave is brilliantly developed with a wealth of puns,³⁷ and the ironic inventiveness of the whole poem is as captivating as the slave hopes to be. At the same time the reader may well ask: how does this poem belong in a book devoted to ethics? And how can such a book be compared to a male prostitute?³⁸ Now any reader of Horace knows he is far from solemn or pompous; but his humour here, as usual, is more than a spoonful of honey to help down the bitter ethical pill: rather, it *is* the ethics. The joke is on Horace himself. He adopts the pose of the elder and better, warns the book of what is in store for it and finally turns his back on it with a laugh. But the fact remains that

³⁵ *Epistle* 6 is also a kind of protreptic: see K.-H. on its line 29. But it is unusual as such in having a strong sceptical streak: cf. Sex. Emp., *Adv. Eth.* 110-40 who like Horace argues that to 'pursue intensely' (συντόμως διώκειν) any end at all is damaging, and applies this principle to different choices of goal, pleasure, fame or wealth. Thus here Horace is aware that even *virtus* can become a delusion if pursued to excess (15-16; the Stoics too saw this: see K.-H. ad loc.). So in his protreptics Horace does not, like Aristotle or Isocrates, impress and inspire the reader, but soberly points out, together with our need for right living, the difficulties that attend the search for it.

In general on the typical features of protreptics, see I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus* (1961), 19-24; P. Hartlich, *De exhortationum a Graecis Romanisque*

scriptarum historia et indole (1889). For a lucid account of the argument of *Ep.* 6, see E. Courbaud, *Horace: sa vie et sa pensée à l'époque des Épîtres* (1914), 105-16.

³⁶ The end of the book, like the beginning, is a natural place for a programmatic poem: cf. *CQ* 23 (1973), 308. And to address or describe the physical book is a common way of saying something about the poetic character of its contents as a whole; besides Catullus 1, cf. Meleager, *AP* 4. 1; Cinna, frag. 11 Morel; Ovid, *Tr.* 1. 1. For the poet as the delinquent slave, cf. *Ep.* 2. 2. 1 ff.

³⁷ On these see Fraenkel, op. cit. (n. 7), 356-9. Note further on lines 17-19, S. F. Bonner, *AJP* 93 (1972), 509-28.

³⁸ cf. McGann, op. cit. (n. 12), 85.

the volume is his work and his property; its escaping is a transparent fiction. Arrian uses the same fiction in the preface to his *Discourses of Epictetus*; but his purpose is to explain the unliterary manner of the work and by his modesty predispose the reader to receive it well.³⁹ Horace's book, by contrast, is *Sosiorum pumice mundus* (2), just as Catullus' is *arida modo pumice expolitus* (1. 2): the polished appearance of the book corresponds to the polish of the poems it contains. Further, by comparing his book to a beautiful slave-boy, Horace brings out its winsomeness: like all poetry, it is and should be designed to please (cf. *Ars Poetica* 338-46).⁴⁰ Horace, then, is far from quietly justifying a plain style as Arrian does, and as one might have expected from the would-be philosopher (cf. Sen., *Ep.* 75. 1-7) or the writer of *sermones* (cf. *Sat.* 1. 4. 39-63; 1. 10. 36-9).⁴¹ Rather, in criticizing the book/slave, Horace is criticizing a part of himself, the vain author, anxious for publicity and admiration (cf. *Ep.* 2. 1. 219-28); and when he warns it (13)

aut fugies Uticam aut vinctus mitteris Ilerdam

that wittily transposes into the tone of this poem and the terms of its dominant metaphor the boast he makes for his own work in *Odes* 2. 20. 17-20, that he will be read and learned by heart from end to end of the known world.⁴² Similarly, *paucis ostendi gemis* (4) is the reverse of *spectatum satis* in 1. 1. 2, words with which Horace renounced poetry for philosophy. It goes with this that in the self-portrait which concludes the poem he is keen to cut a fine figure, telling the book to play down his family's standing in order to point up his own merits: Horace is doing what any author wants to do, sell himself. But because the poem stands back from this natural vanity and eyes it with humorous detachment, it embodies the philosophic self-criticism typical of Horace and essential to the *Epistles* as it was to the *Satires*, which is neither covert complacency nor voluptuous self-laceration. It is this quality that makes Horace a credible, agreeable, but also quite unsparing, moralist.

What has been said so far was meant to be comment on Horace's poetry as well as on his ethics. But it may be worthwhile to look more closely at one *Epistle*, trying to do more justice to the quality of expression in these poems; for though they are *sermones*, they have their own type of poetry no less rigorous and subtle than that of the *Odes*. A few final words, then, on *Epistle* 10.

The poem begins with a parody of a formal salutation:

urbis amatorem Fuscum salvere iubemus
ruris amatores.

This device amuses; it also makes an initial statement of the contrast between town and country which runs through the poem. But what follows, while it stresses the difference between the two friends, also shows them affectionately attached as twins. The two sides of their relationship are joined in the metaphor of the doves (5, *vetuli notique columbi*); for doves are proverbially loving, but there are also two kinds of dove, one which stays at home and one which roams about.⁴³ The latter kind is what Horace is; and leaving the nest is an image of freedom, a notion now developed through the related language of kingship and slavery. The poet is as happy as a king when he has abandoned what others loudly acclaim as kings or great men are acclaimed,⁴⁴ or when he has become like a runaway slave: to be

³⁹ On the function of this preface, and for parallels to the notion of the escaping book, see the excellent remarks of Th. Wirth, *MH* 24 (1967), 149-61; note also Dover's commentary on Aristophanes, *Clouds*, p. 270 (Addendum to p. xcviij).

⁴⁰ For humorous or sarcastic characterizations of poetry or style as sexually attractive see Ar., *Thes.* 130-3; Cat. 16; Lucr. 1. 642-4; Pers. 1. 19-21; Juv. 7. 82-7, where the poet is the pander: this last passage is admirably discussed by V. Tandoi, *Maia* 21 (1969), 103-22.

⁴¹ On the *Epistles* as *sermones* see 2. 1. 250 (probably also 1. 4. 1); A. La Penna, *ASNP* 18 (1949), 14.

A plain style is also proper for letters: see Dem., *Eloc.* 223; Quintil. 9. 4. 19.

⁴² cf. N.-H. on *Od.* 2. 20. 14; and possibly the bird-image in line 21 ironically echoes *Od.* 2. 20. 9-12. Line 20 corresponds to 'pauperum sanguis parentum' in *Od.* 2. 20. 5-6, and line 23 to 'ego quem vocas, dilecte Maecenas' in *Od.* 2. 20. 6-7. In general on Horace's mockery of his own *amour propre* as a poet in the *Epistles*, see *CQ* 27 (1977), 373-5.

⁴³ K.-H. compare Varro, *RR* 3. 7. 1-2.

⁴⁴ cf. A. Stuijver s.v. 'Beifall' in *RAC* 2 (1954), 95-6.

really a king, i.e. supremely happy or free,⁴⁵ Horace has escaped what is the real slavery, a taste for glory or luxury (8-11):

quid quaeris? vivo et regno simul ista reliqui
 quae vos ad caelum fertis rumore secundo;
 utque sacerdotis fugitivus liba recuso,
 pane egeo iam mellitis potiore placentis

Now comes a spirited vindication of the country (12 ff.):

vivere naturae si convenienter oportet
 ponendaeque domo quaerenda est area primum
 novistine locum potiore mure beato?

Vivere naturae . . . convenienter echoes the Stoic principle that a man, as a rational being, should be governed by his reason and accept his place in the universe, which is likewise rational (ὁμολογουμένως τῆ φύσει ζῆν). But Horace adapts the doctrine to his own argument: *natura* here means man's natural needs and satisfactions which Epicurus took as the guide to right living; and these the country best fulfils.⁴⁶ From this proposition and from line 13 it follows that the country is the place to live. It turns out, then, that the runaway slave or wandering dove, Horace, has in fact found himself a home, and that in doing so he has achieved what every one by nature wants. So if lines 15-21 are at first sight merely a series of arguments designed to prove that the country is superior to the town, they are on closer inspection a way of suggesting what all human beings must find in order to live well. The country is in effect a symbol; and *Epistle* 11 reinforces the point that places are in the end indifferent to our happiness. In the country there is nothing violent or forced, so pleasures are genuine and untroubled; and the needs of the senses are appeased:

est ubi plus tepeant hiemes, ubi gratior aura
 leniat et rabiem Canis et momenta Leonis
 cum semel accepit Solem furibundus acutum?
 est ubi divellat somnos minus invida cura?
 deterius Libycis olet aut nitet herba lapillis?
 purior in vicis aqua tendit rumpere plumbum
 quam quae per pronum trepidat cum murmure rivum?

Thus even men who make themselves luxury houses try to find or to simulate a country setting for it (22-3); for (24-5)

naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret
 et mala perrumpet furtim fastidia victrix.

Perrumpet echoes *rumpere* in line 20: the piped water in town struggles in vain to break through the lead, whereas *natura* triumphantly breaks through our daintiness. So while *natura* avoids violence, it is also in its quiet way a conqueror (*furtim . . . victrix*). Thus Horace revalues the language of superiority: 'kingship' in line 8 (*regno*) and 'conquest' in line 25 (*victrix*) are boldly associated with a peaceful and unassuming existence;⁴⁷ for that is really the supreme happiness and the irresistible goal.

The argument is developed by a further comparison (26-9):

⁴⁵ cf. *SVF* 1. 216, 3. 617. Further on kingship as supreme freedom, see J. de Romilly, *Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism* (1963), 79-82 and Aesch., *PV* 49-50; and as supreme happiness, Solon, frag. 33W; Plat., *Gorg.* 470D-471D, 492B; *Theag.* 125E-126A; Lucian, *Icarom.* 25; Arist., *Rhet.* 1371^b 26.

⁴⁶ cf. K.-H. on lines 12 and 24; further Epic., *Basic Doctrines* 15 = *Vatican Sayings* 8; frags. 202-3, 468-9, 471, 477. Epicurus also commended country-life (frag. 570); cf. Lucr. 2. 20-33, 5. 1390-6. If, as G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in*

Roman Poetry (1968), 596-7, suggests, Horace is punning in line 24 on *natura* as both 'great creating nature' (cf. Lucr. 1. 629 etc.) and man's natural needs or desires, that has a background in Epicurus; and there is no merely comical sophistry here, any more than there is portentous dogmatism.

⁴⁷ This kind of 'persuasive definition' is typically Stoic: see *Od.* 2. 2. 19-21 and N.-H. ad loc. Note also Epic. frag. 476-7; K.-H. on Hor., *Sat.* 2. 2. 15; Lucan 2. 384-7.

non qui Sidonio contendere callidus ostro
nescit Aquinatem potentia vellera fucum
certius accipiet damnum propiusve medullis
quam qui non poterit vero distinguere falsum.

What matters is to tell true from false: the connoisseurs who distinguish, or fail to distinguish, different grades of dye are both dealing with something whose whole purpose is to falsify.⁴⁸ 'True' here means true to our natural needs; and it is in the service of this kind of truth that Horace has revised the language of kingship and victory. This manipulation of conventional usage continues in the following lines. By running away from grandeur, our life can run ahead of kings': we win the race by opting out of the race (32-3):

fuge magna: licet sub paupere tecto
reges et regum vita praecurrere amicos.

(*Fuge* here recalls *fugitivus* in line 10; and *reges . . . vita praecurrere* recalls *vivo et regno* in line 8.) Conversely, the horse in the fable which conquered by force (37, *victor violens*) was unable to cast off (38, *depulit*) its rider or the bit; and so it was in an even worse plight than when the stag was casting him out (35, *pellebat*) of their common field. The victor, by winning, became a slave. The contrast to this is freedom (40, *libertate*), which is to exploit limited means rather than be exploited for the whole of life (41):⁴⁹

serviet aeternum quia parvo nesciet uti.

This gives a further meaning to *vivere naturae . . . convenienter*: we have to accept a modest wealth and status. This is, in fact, in Epicurean terms the same as following our natural desires, since these are always limited.⁵⁰ Horace again uses the word *convenire* to make the point (42-3):

cui non conveniet sua res, ut calceus olim,
si pede maior erit, subvertet, si minor, uret

Here there is another twist in the expression which makes the homely comparison more than a platitude: it is not the shoe that has to fit us, it is we who have to fit the shoe, our condition. Freedom is not the same as unlimited scope for our whims.⁵¹

Finally, Horace turns directly to his addressee again. It is clear by now that his apparent aim of proving the country better than the town was only apparent. This is delicately brought out by the use of comparatives (which are very numerous)⁵² in the poem. In lines 14-20 they are used to commend Horace's preference for the country against the town; but it is a different kind of contrast, between genuine and conventional superiority, which really counts and to which the other comparatives, except the rather ironic *melior* and *minor* in lines 34-5, are related. Thus for Horace to get the better of the 'argument' with Fuscus would be as useless as it was for the horse to defeat the stag. The way in which the two friends should try to exercise control is by correcting each other's mistakes (44-8):

laetus sorte tua vives sapienter, Aristi,
nec me dimittes incastigatum⁵³ ubi plura
cogere quam satis est ac non cessare videbor.
imperat aut servit collecta pecunia cuique,
tortum digna sequi potius quam ducere funem.

⁴⁸ cf. esp. Virgil, *Georg.* 2. 465, and in general the use of *fucus* and cognates; also Hor., *Ep.* 2. 1. 207: 'lana Tarentino violas imitata veneno'. *Imitata* in this context hints at Plato's condemnation of dramatic *μίμησις*; and *violae* evokes *violare* = *μιαίνειν* (note Virgil, *Aen.* 12. 67 with Homer., *II.* 4. 141, 146). The general sense of the line recalls *Ion* 535 D 2: κερκοσημένους ἐσθῆτι ποικίλη, as 211-13 recall *Ion* 535C 1-3.

For the thought of *Ep.* 1. 10. 26-9 K.-H. compare Epic. frag. 548; for non-Epicurean parallels see A.

La Penna, *Ann. scuol. norm. Pisa* 18 (1949), 26.

⁴⁹ There is a tension between *aeternum* and *parvo*, and between *serviet* and *uti*. The notion of freedom here has an Epicurean flavour (cf. K.H. on line 40).

⁵⁰ cf. Epic., frag. 471-8.

⁵¹ cf. *Od.* 2. 2. 9-12 and N.-H. ad loc.

⁵² See lines 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 28, 34, 35, 39, 43, 45, 48.

⁵³ On this phrase, appropriate to Fuscus' profession of *grammaticus*, see R. G. M. Nisbet, *CQ* N.S. 9 (1959), 74-5.

Horace's whole poem was in a sense an admonition to Fuscus, and at this point he invites Fuscus to admonish him, if need be; but there will be need only if Horace forces wealth upon himself. *Nec me dimittes* is picked up by *cogere*, which is used here in its literal sense of 'gather' (*co-agere*) but carries as an overtone its normal sense 'compel'. Again paradoxes reinforce the argument: Horace is to be 'punished' only if he does *not* idle; and the man who 'gathers' (or 'compels') too much may well find that his 'collected' wealth 'lords it' over him. Once more, supremacy won by forcing nature is slavery; and the error which needs controlling is an excess of control.

The last two lines of the poem are utterly unobtrusive, but no less pregnant than the rest:

haec tibi dictabam post fanum putre Vacunae,
excepto quod non simul esses cetera laetus.

Vacuna was a Sabine goddess whom Varro identified with Victoria (see pseudo-Acro ad loc.); an inscription (*CIL* xiv. 3485) records that the emperor Vespasian restored a temple of Victory near Horace's villa.⁵⁴ This interpretation of Vacuna must be in play here, given that the poem throughout employs in a bold and significant manner the language of victory and defeat. So these words are a further rejection of success as commonly conceived, in that the shrine of Victory is 'crumbling'. At the same time, they suggest that there is a better kind of success, which is indicated also by Varro's etymology for the name Vacuna: 'quod ea maxime hi gaudent qui sapientiae vacent'; the leisure and study implicit in the word *vacare*, or the philosophic 'victory', is precisely what Horace enjoys in the country, and at the shrine of Vacuna. The last line shows that Horace is what he tells Fuscus to be, happy (*laetus* in 44 and 50); *excepto quod non simul esses* points as well to another requirement for happiness, friendship, again a theme typical of Epicurus.⁵⁵ So happiness is not merely a question of living in studious retirement with our own needs or circumstances, but of taking pleasure in others' company when they are there, and so too of missing them when they are not. Friendship is a natural and necessary counterpart to freedom, the ideal which pervades this *Epistle*; for friendship is the affection we share with others and freedom the independence we have from them, when there is no attempt to dominate, to be 'king' or 'victor'. The wise man, then, does not become a 'winner' by avoiding all attachments, a point made more openly in the next *Epistle* (11. 6 ff.). And thus we rejoin the beginning of the poem, where Horace was no less fond of Fuscus because their tastes clashed.

In the *Ars Poetica* Horace envisaged a kind of poetry which would arise from both the study of ethics and the observation of life, which would at once instruct and delight its readers, which would, in short, embody in every sense the ideal of 'propriety' (esp. 309-44).⁵⁶ The immediate object of his words there is drama; but what he says of drama in the *Ars* is not meant to apply only to drama, and propriety is a concept applicable to every form of writing, as to living itself. It goes with this that the practice of poetry makes moral demands on the poet (esp. *AP* 309 ff.). The *Epistles* are poetry of an unusual quality because they scrutinize the pleasures, pains and problems of living against a standard, a standard represented by philosophy, and because the author's experience, more than anyone else's, undergoes that examination. For the same reasons they are peculiarly valuable as a historical document; for we understand more fully what life was like when we see, in the powerful light of an artistic recreation, how someone applied to his own existence a notion of what it was meant to be like.⁵⁷

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⁵⁴ Either Horace, by a small poetic licence, renamed the goddess of the temple Vacuna, or Vespasian renamed her Victoria, presumably because that divinity is closely associated with the emperor (cf. *ILS* III. 1, p. 555).

⁵⁵ See esp. frag. 174-5; *BD* 27-8; *VS* 13, 23, 52. Also Arist., *EN* 9. 9.

⁵⁶ See esp. Cic., *Or.* 69-74. In general, M. Pohlenz, *NGG* 1933, 53-92 = *Kleine Schriften* 1 (1965), 100-39.

⁵⁷ I have been greatly helped by criticisms from Mr. D. O. M. Charles and by previous conversation with him.